e.proof.¶
e.proof. is a match pattern, never a code. It selects every code below it, including ones minted after your handler was written.
The obstacle: Supplied material fails verification against a reference.
This obstacle has no standard sub-descriptors, so every leaf under it is one a repo minted for itself.
Codes under this prefix¶
e.proof.aggregate.f— The credential's aggregate does not derive the identifier it claims, so I refuse it.e.proof.anchor.chain.f— The anchor chain does not hold together.e.proof.anchor.f— The only seal for that artifact sits in somebody else's key history, and an endorsement is not a commitment.e.proof.anchor.head.f— An anchor names a commit the record's history does not contain.e.proof.attributes.said.f— That attribute block doesn't address itself, so I stopped rather than quietly relabelling it.e.proof.binding.f— The registry evidence does not bind the credential you presented, so I refuse the substitution.e.proof.binding.presentation-registry.f— The presentation registry disagrees with an identity source, so I refuse the presentation.e.proof.binding.sedi-age-identity.f— That age credential does not bind itself to a Core identity, so I refuse it.e.proof.binding.sedi-guardians.f— That Core's guardians group does not name guardianships the way SEDI does, so I refuse it.e.proof.binding.ward-authority.f— The ward authorization rests on a guardianship its ward's Core does not name, so I refuse the graph.e.proof.binding.ward-issuee.f— A guardianship this Core's guardians group names does not name the Core's issuee as its ward, so I refuse the graph.e.proof.blind.f— The disclosed registry state does not verify, so I cannot judge the credential.e.proof.chain.edge.f— An edge in that credential's chain does not hold, so I refuse it.e.proof.claim.proofing-datetime.f— The signed ACDC does not disclose a valid timezone-aware proofing datetime.e.proof.claim.signed-acdc.f— The signed ACDC does not disclose a valid issuee and challenge nonce.e.proof.endorsement.sig.f— A segment's endorsement doesn't verify, so I can't tell who supplied it.e.proof.event.chain.f— A key event's prior digest doesn't match the event it claims to follow, so the chain breaks.e.proof.event.sig.f— A key event's controller signature doesn't verify, so the key history isn't authentic.e.proof.grant.recipient.f— That grant is addressed to somebody else, so I won't admit it.e.proof.presenter.f— That credential names an issuee, and the party presenting it is neither the issuee nor the issuer.e.proof.request.digest.f— The request body doesn't match its Content-Digest, so I can't treat the body as the one that was signed.e.proof.request.sig.f— The signature doesn't match the request under the signer's key, so I can't treat the request as authentic.e.proof.rotation.digest.f— The keys about to be revealed don't re-digest to what this key history committed to.e.proof.rules.said.f— That rules block doesn't address itself, so I stopped rather than quietly relabelling it.e.proof.said.f— A document does not hash to the SAID it carries.e.proof.schema.f— The credential does not validate against the schema it names, so I refuse it.e.proof.schema.said.f— The address I fetched a schema from served a different schema, so I stored nothing.e.proof.sig.f— The signature doesn't match the data under the signer's key state.e.proof.sig.grant.f— The grant's signature does not verify against its sender's current key state, so I won't admit it.e.proof.signature.acdc.f— The issuer's referenced key state does not satisfy this ACDC's signatures.e.proof.signature.reference.f— The signature names an establishment event that disagrees with the issuer's verified key history.